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Abstract
This paper analyses data collected over a nine month period in a simple VoIP honeypot based on simple design
initially put forward by Usken(2009). The honeypot collected 2083 events of malfeasant activity directed
towards commonly used VoIP ports. These events resulted in a range of activity being recorded from simple
enumeration to advanced probing and attempts to compromise the victim honeypot. The analysis involved
traditional statistics from packet analysis, using customised scripts for extraction of data and graphical analysis
using i2 Analyst Workstation. The analysis has uncovered an escalation of network activity directed towards the
honeypot over a nine month period. Initial geographical IP resolutions also see the majority of traffic emanating
from the Chinese IP space. There is strong evidence to suggest that there is a botnet or worm like malcode being
directed or developed for VoIP routers.

Keywords
VoIP, honeypot, forensics.

INTRODUCTION
This paper outlines the investigation into data that has been collected by an ongoing project to develop a Voice
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) based honeypot system. The research already has produced several outcomes
including simple Snort IDS rules, unique NMAP (Fyodor 1998) operating system fingerprints for commodity
VoIP routers and some preliminary scripts for topical emulation of a VoIP router administration menu. The
research has also produced 2083 candidate events that are potentially malfeasant behaviour directed at the
honeypot over a period of nine months.
This paper is not primarily concerned with the construction of a honeypot rather the analysis of its outcomes.
The honeypot used in this research itself builds on work by (Usken 2009) in developing simple honeypot
systems for VoIP. The design of the particular honeypot used in this research was outlined in (Valli and AlLawati 2010).
This paper performs analysis on the 2083 candidate events that were recorded by a actual single honeypot that
has operated for the duration of the project. The events that were captured for analysis were triggered by any
connection to commonly known and used TCP and UDP ports for VoIP communication. The resulting
connection triggered the recording of the event as a network stream in network packet dumps in the commonly
used tcpdump (MartinGarcia 2010) file format. The resulting packet dumps have been used as the raw data for
the analysis provided in this paper.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Macro analysis was performed on all of the particular recorded packet dumps which were concatenated into one
large file for easier analysis and extraction of data. Wireshark (Team 2010) was used for the packet level
analysis of the concatenated file of packet traces and also the singular packet traces of each recorded event as
necessitated during the research for the paper.
This concatenated data were subjected to traditional statistical measures, geographical IP resolution and also
analyzed using the i2 analyst workstation which allows for graphical visualization and query of the data sets.
The concatenated capture file was read by tcpdump (MartinGarcia 2010) and then pushed through the Afterglow
(Marty 2010) suite of scripts. The information extracted included source and destination IP addresses, source
and destination TCP/UDP ports and packet timestamps enabling time lining of the events. The extracted data
were then manipulated in a series of Excel spreadsheets, as well as a combination of customised scripts which
were used to process and extract information for analysis or representation for example converting the
geographical IP data into a Google Keyhole Markup Language (KML) format file for display in Google Earth.
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One of the standard measures used by many analysis tools is the top 10 normally by volume or magnitude. The
following is a table of the top 10 attacking IP addresses.
IP

Count

Country

121.14.149.145

60

China

60.190.173.30

47

China

117.41.168.235

45

China

117.41.228.243

36

China

113.105.152.220

27

China

121.14.139.34

27

China

121.14.149.175

27

China

121.12.127.168

26

China

119.147.116.249

25

Unknown

117.41.229.74

24

China

Table 1: Top 10 Attacking IPs
The details presented in the table are valid but of little investigative value for most forensic purposes, however
they are descriptive and can be used to start a line of analysis or inquiry. The nature of the Internet is such that an
attacking endpoint can be singular i.e an IP address or multiple addresses typically from a subnet. The important
thing to consider in a forensic analysis of this type is the network endpoint from which the attack emanated or
was routed from. The endpoint in the case of compromised networks is the border router for a particular subnet
or single real IP. Using this approach this significantly changes the view of the attack epochs. When this logic of
border is then applied further to the dataset as geo-located IP addresses a different pattern emerges. The raw data
was also subjected to geographical IP query using a customised script and querying a geolocation to IP database.
The following table lists the top 10 entries at a level of Country of origin resolution.
Country

IP

China

1041

63.7%

Unknown/Unassigned

273

16.7%

USA

120

7.3%

India

28

1.7%

Vietnam

27

1.7%

Taiwan

20

1.2%

Korea

16

1.0%

Indonesia

13

0.8%

Russia

13

0.8%

Malaysia

11

0.7%

Table 2: Top 10 Attacking IPs by Country
The second largest item Unknown was composed of either IP numbers that did not result in a resolution in the
geographical IP databases as it was unknown or was a spoofed unassigned IP number. The majority of
malfeasant traffic at this stage has originated from IP spaces from the Chinese mainland, this is concurrent with
observations from other Australian honeypots (Reardon 2010).

Further drilling down with the geographical IP databases for the top ten cities produces the following table of
results from the dataset.
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Province

City

Country

Guangzhou

Guangdong

CN

326

Beijing

Beijing

CN

308

Dongguan

Guangdong

CN

152

Zhengzhou

Henan

CN

78

Huzhou

Zhejiang

CN

47

Shanghai

Shanghai

CN

23

Hangzhou

Zhejiang

CN

19

Wuhan

Hubei

CN

13

Changsha

Hunan

CN

12

Nanning
Guangxi
CN
10
Table 3: Top 10 Attacking IPs by City
It is interesting to note that the Guangdong province accounts for almost 50% of China's attributable traffic with
478 events. Also the top three cities within this table with 786 events comprise just under 25% of all events that
were logged by the honeypot. The traffic from these regions has been consistent and persistent in probing the
honeypot.
Individual micro analysis was performed on candidate events of interest to determine where possible the type of
attack or behaviour that was evinced in the execution of that event. The classification is based on the SIP Info
and the User-agent details contained within the packets sent to the honeypot. The signatures and handshakes are
provided in the Table 4 below.
Scanner (SIP Info)
asterisk
asterisk
sipsscuser
sipvicious
Asterisk

Events
User-agent
700
Asterix PBX
419
423
sundayddr
331
friendly-scanner
7
friendly-scanner
Table 4: Event Fingerprint/Signature data

The sipvicious(Guac 2010) signatures examined are consistent with use of a default configured sipvicious
scanner to enumerate the honeypot. The actual packet traces produced by these particular events are also
consistent with default scanning modes provided by the sipvicious tool in duration and magnitude.
The sipsscuser signature based activity detected in the honeypot is interesting and started being recorded on the
honeypot on 8 July 2010 and also was the last event extracted from the dataset which occurred on 17 November
2010. The attack profile this particular signature is generating is best described as a persistent threat. The modus
operandi displayed by this particular event signature would also indicate similar worm or botnet like activity as
detected by Reardon, 2010. The signature provided by this candidate indicates that it is potentially a modified
sipvicious scanner or one using the same initial code base.
Sipvicious

Modified sipsscuser

From:"sipvicious"<sip:100@1.1.1.1>;
tag=63626131373537653133633401333135363739323
63136
Accept: application/sdp
User-Agent: friendly-scanner
To: "sipvicious"<sip:100@1.1.1.1>
Contact: sip:100@127.0.0.1:5064
CSeq: 1 OPTIONS
Call-ID: 532778670076825915635622
Max-Forwards: 70

From:"sipsscuser"<sip:100@192.168.1.9>;
tag=665879545572395724923248927313319215039211
04449
Accept: application/sdp
User-Agent: sundayddr
To: "sipssc"<sip:100@192.168.1.9>
Contact: sip:100@192.168.1.9:5060
CSeq: 1 OPTIONS
Call-ID: 212163834799713241150823794
Max-Forwards: 70

Table 5 - Comparision of sipvicious and sipsscuser
The range of hosts using this tool or piece of code is extensive. The other interesting pattern to note is attributed
hosts using this code propagate less than 5 probe events against the honeypot before disappearing. The
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geographical origin of this attack profile indicates 82% are coming from host IP addresses originating from the
Chinese mainland.
This mode of attack is in stark contrast to some of the concerted efforts by the single attacking hosts or subnets
seen elsewhere in the dataset. This event signature also signals an escalation of attack complexity from
traditional script kiddies who use a tool in default mode to the same attacker trialling or developing new tools or
malware. This modus operandii indicates a botnet or some automata for compromise and control of scanning IP.
In an online article Reardon (2010) mentions a plausible scenario for propagation of modified VoIP targeted
malware via a botnet of victims via SSH compromise and push of payload to the victim computers. The data
from this research also supports Reardon's suggested modus operandii.
The analysis undertaken with i2 analyst notebook was exploratory in nature and looked to identify emergent
patterns or inconsistency in events through graphical visualisation and analysis of the data. The visualisation of
data clearly indicated that the VoIP honeypot was successfully compromised by attackers. The following figure
is a snapshot from this graphical analysis

Figure 1: i2 workstation analysis
Upon trace analysis it was determined that there was successful compromise of the emulated VoIP system. The
successful compromise of the honeypot saw attackers utilise it to attack another honeypot device within the same
physical network subnet. The activity was such that it used four current hosts (circled on image) that the attacker
controlled and scanned the next viable target IP in the honeypots subnet. When the scans determined that the
newly targeted host was potentially vulnerable to compromise it changed attack vector. The change in attack
vector was an attempt to obfuscate their malicious activity as further directed attack against the newly identified
victim was from an IP address external to the honeypot subnet. In addition to being external the IP was one not
previously used in the widespread attack of the honeypot at that point in time. This particular successful
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compromise indicates an increasing maturity of the attacks perpetrated against VoIP systems known to be
vulnerable.

KNOWLEDGE, OPPORTUNITY AND MOTIVATION?
The honeypot in this research is basically designed to mimic a domestic VoIP implementation that a standard
home user may actually be using. Any crime that is commissioned normally contains three essential hallmarks:
knowledge, opportunity and motive. An analysis of these can often aid in the remediation or elimination of the
crime.
The analysis of data clearly indicates an escalation in the exploitation attempts targeting VoIP installations. The
data, analysis and subsequent evidence clearly indicate that the attackers have knowledge specific to how VoIP
is deployed, probed and attacked. There is also clear evidence that their knowledge is growing through
development of complex attack methods utilising advanced network exploitation techniques.
As to opportunity, the attackers are exploiting the opportunity afforded to them by the Internet to compromise
VoIP implementations that are sitting on relatively insecure default devices. Further opportunity is expanded as
detection of malfeasant activity on home systems is negligible due to the naive or novice nature of the home or
small business user.
Motivation beyond the criminal intent in this current scenario however is much harder to determine. Large
commercial VoIP systems typically have a corresponding large amount of bandwidth on which to send data. It is
therefore easier to hide malfeasant activity in a larger volume of data. In essence, a salami attack or slicing of
this bandwidth can be used to accommodate extra VoIP traffic which would evade detection as long the footprint
was comparatively small as compared to the overall size of the connection. The same corresponding attack on a
relatively low bandwidth home-based installation however will in all probability be detected. The detection
however may not be as a result of observed degradation of service but via an alternate channel, which is at the
next pay period for the Internet or VoIP service. This detection will be possibly as a result of the stolen
bandwidth potentially causing an increase in service charge or traffic volume due to the relative size of Internet
installation. In addition, there can also be telephony charges associated with the service which again due to the
relative low volumes in a household or small business with any significant increase would be easily apparent.
Also in the case of the home user they tend to dial a restricted set or known numbers and again matched against
the billing may alert the end user to malfeasant activity.
Victims compromised by the use of the identified botnet mechanism may not be in fact targeted for financial
gain directly through the theft of telephony as the key motivating factor. Financial gain may instead be garnered
as a result of directed distributed denial of service (DDoS) of a third party. The motivation is a sustained DDoS
of corporate entities that have critical business exposure on the Internet as a result of service dependencies. The
dependencies directly relates to service availability that is one of the core elements for business success and
sustainability for example online gambling or online banking. These particular types of network dependent
businesses are the targets and consequently enable the primary motivation for compromise of a home or small
business users VoIP system.
Furthermore, the control of a large range of victim hosts also has the unfortunate plausible scenario that these
telephony devices are used to flood the public switched telephone network with calls in the case of an emergency
or a physical attack such as a terrorist incident. This scenario is plausible as the VoIP service on the
compromised hosts could be made to make simultaneous and repeated calls to a particular telephone or
telephone exchange. Another plausible explanation for motivation is for snooping in on voice communications
that are being carried or transmitted through these VoIP routers this could be for a variety of reasons including
intelligence gathering or industrial espionage.

FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper is an analysis of one data set taken from this single ADSL based honeypot. The next analysis will be
a combination of data taken from various honeypots within the Australian context. This combined analysis will
allow correlation of events across a wider network space and also time continuum. Furthermore, the extended
dataset will allow for a more in-depth analysis relating to traffic patterns, distribution methods and modus
operandi of any botnet or targeted network borne malware that is being used.
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There is a definite need to conduct research into this area because unlike other areas of Internet malfeasance this
can have significant and direct financial gain for the perpetrator of the attack through theft of service. Unlike
many other network borne attacks these may in fact be also readily directed at national critical infrastructure in
the form of the telecommunications networks to cause denial of service.
There needs to be research conducted into the methods of targeting in use. This will allow researchers to
determine if the compromises that are appearing are totally automated or in fact have human actors. It is
indicated from the data in this study and also from Reardon (2010), that there is development of automated
attacks being undertaken.

CONCLUSION
This research has uncovered significant patterns of attack that are being directed against VoIP systems. The
magnitude of attacks perpetrated is across the full range from simple opportunistic scanning through to full
penetration and compromise of a VoIP honeypot. This research also strongly supports other indications of an
escalation of attacks from systems located within the Chinese IP spaces with almost 70% of attacks being
directly attributable.
The analysis indicates an escalation of attack complexity and sophistication being used. At this stage however,
targeting of hosts seems very opportunistic and not discriminatory. Indications are also that the level of attack is
reaching a persistent level with several significant attacks per day being experienced by the honeypot.
Motivations for escalation of attack on this type of device are also questionable and warrant significant
investigation.
Further research is desperately needed to ameliorate the significant threat to this current activity poses to VoIP
systems and overall network stability for both the Internet and standard telephony-based services.

REFERENCES
Fyodor. (1998). "Remote OS detection via TCP/IP stack fingerprinting." Retrieved 10 May, 2002, from
http://www.insecure.org/nmap/nmap-fingerprinting-article.txt.
Guac, S. (2010). SIPVicious tool suite.
MartinGarcia, L. (2010). tcpdump.
Marty, R. (2010). Afterglow, Raffael Marty.
Reardon, B. (2010). "Sunday (sundayddr) SIP scanning worm. When printers turn bad.." Retrieved 17th
November, from http://www.honeynet.org.au/?q=sunday_scanner.
Team, T. W. (2010). Wireshark, Riverbed Technology.
Usken, S. E. (2009). "VoIP - Voice over IP or haVock over IP?", from http://www.honeynor.no/data/honeynetvoip-presentation-anonym.pdf.
Valli, C. and M. Al-Lawati (2010). Developing VoIP Router honeypots. 2010 International Conference on
Security & Management,, Las Vegas Nevada, USA, CSREA Press.

174 | P a g e

